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THE RISE AND FALL OF INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS: 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGIONS a,b 
 
Mario A. Maggionic 
 
ABSTRACT: When a major technological innovation spreads out in both high-tech and 
middle/low-tech industries, new clusters appear, develop and grow at the expenses of “older” 
historical industrial sites. The literature has, under various labels, recognised three main stages 
of cluster development: an initial stage sparked by an initial exogenous, shock; a second stage 
driven by Marshall’s (1920) agglomeration economies (labour market pooling, supply of 
intermediate goods and services and knowledge spillovers); a third stage in which the cluster 
either achieves a sectoral leadership or declines. The paper shows how different clusters’ 
evolution (often told as separated stories) are part of a wider picture in which technological and 
spatial interactions between emerging and declining clusters play a decisive role. A final section 
draws some policy suggestions for public authorities and regional planners dealing with the 
development of an innovative cluster. 
 
Keywords: Industrial clusters, technological dynamics, agglomeration economies and 
diseconomies. 
JEL Classification : O33, R3, R11. 
 
 
 
RESUMEN: Cuando una gran innovación tecnológica se extiende en las industrias de cualquier 
nivel de tecnificación, nuevos clusters aparecen, se desarrollan y crecen a costa de formas 
industriales más antiguas. La literatura ha reconocido, bajo diversas denominaciones, tres 
estados principales en el desarrollo de los clusters: un estado inicial marcado por un primer 
shock exógeno; un segundo estado influenciado por las economías de aglomeración de Marshall 
(1920) (mercado laboral único, suministro de bienes y servicios intermedios y externalidades 
por el lado del conocimiento); y un tercer estado en el cual los clusters bien acaban liderando un 
sector bien se deterioran. El trabajo muestra cómo la evolución de los diferentes clusters (con 
frecuencia explicado como cuestiones separadas) son parte de un marco más amplio en el cual 
las interacciones espaciales y tecnológicas entre clusters emergentes y en declive juegan un 
papel decisivo. Una sección final traza alguna sugerencia política para autoridades públicas 
regionales que tengan que tratar con el desarrollo de un cluster innovador. 
 
Palabras clave: Clusters industriales, dinámica tecnológica, economías y deseconomías de 
aglomeración. 
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I will tell the story as I go along of small cities no less than of great. Most of those 
which were great once are small today; and those which in my own lifetime have 
growth to greatness were small enough in the old days”  
Herodotus (440 B.C.), The History, quoted in J. Jacobs (1969)  
 
As new industries emerge, firms in those industries may then be faced with location 
decision of the following sort. Should they locate in an old cluster, where they have 
little commonality with incumbents where the established infrastructure is dated, 
and where congestion costs are still relatively high though admittedly declining? Or 
they do locate in a new cluster where the incumbents, though new and small, are 
generating the sorts of spillovers that attract entrants and are based in more relevant 
industries, and where the infrastructure is better? 
G.M.P. Swann et Al. (1992), The Dynamics of Industrial Clusters, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
 
“Semiconductor manufacture began in Phoenix (Motorola), and Dallas (Texas 
Instruments), at about the same time as Shockley Laboratories and Fairchild 
Semiconductor were established in Santa Clara County in the late 1950s. Aircraft 
production began in Wichita (Cessna), Buffalo (Curtis), Seattle (Boeing), Los 
Angeles (Martin, Lockheed, Douglas), as well as in Baltimore and Bridgeport. Farm 
machinery started up in Stockton (Holt), San Leandro (Holt), and San José (FMC), 
California, as well as in the Midwest. Yet Santa Clara County, Los Angeles and 
Illinois become the overwhelming centers of attraction in semiconductors, aircraft 
and farm machinery, respectively. Only these places developed large complexes of 
firms producing intermediate inputs as well as final outputs”. 
M. Storper - R. Walker (1989), The Capitalist Imperative, Territory, Technology 
and Industrial Growth, Basil Blackwell, New York. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When a major technological innovation spreads out in both high-tech and middle/low-
tech industries, new clusters appear and - if the innovation is commercially successful - 
they often develop and grow at the expenses of “older” historical industrial sites. The 
 3
names of successful areas and products become inseparable (i.e. Detroit and the 
standardised car in the early 1900s, Santa Clara County/Silicon Valley and the 
semiconductors in the mid-1950s, Boston/Route 128 and the minicomputer in the early 
1980s, etc.). 
What happen to new cluster when they become “old” is a matter of interactions between 
agglomeration economies vs. diseconomies on the one hand and the rate of incremental 
vs. radical innovations on the other. Thus technological and regional dynamics go hand 
in hand and they mutually determine each another in a complex web of circular 
cumulative causation (with both positive and negative feed-backs). 
The literature has, under various labels, recognised three main stages of cluster 
development:  
• an initial stage in which the development is sparked by an initial, often 
exogenous, shock (and sustained by the involuntary informational spillover 
provided by early entrants about the profitability of the location); 
• a second stage in which the drivers of Marshall’s (1920) agglomeration 
economies (labour market pooling, supply of intermediate goods and services and 
knowledge spillovers) play a crucial role in sustaining endogenously the growth and 
the structural transformation of the cluster through start-ups and spin-offs;  
• a third stage in which either the cluster achieves a national/international 
leadership in a given sector/technology and becomes resilient, (i.e. able to withstand 
technological shocks and economic recessions1) or the cluster declines (both 
socially and economically) generating – within different institutional frameworks – 
huge migration outflows or mass unemployment.  
The paper intends to develop from Brezis and Krugman (1997) in order to show how 
different clusters’ evolution (often told as separated stories) are part of a wider picture 
in which technological and spatial interactions between emerging and declining clusters 
play a decisive role. The whole process can be easily described within a population 
ecology theoretical framework where both technological dynamics within the cluster 
and spatial interactions between clusters determine the “life cycle” of a cluster. The 
paper makes a parsimonious use of formal analysis (diagrams and simulations) in order 
                                                 
1 Becoming what Markusen (1996) calls a “sticky place”. 
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to illustrate the different possible evolutions of the dynamical system composed by two 
clusters. A final section draws some policy suggestions for public authorities and 
regional planners dealing with the development of an innovative cluster. 
 
2. The development of a cluster: a selected survey 
Throughout the paper, the development of an industrial cluster is modelled as a (non-
monotonic, unimodal) function of the “industrial mass” already located there. This 
intuition (which will be analytically dealt in section 2) – which corresponds to a well 
known and recognised stylised fact of the development of industrial clusters – may be 
derived from alternative a/o complementary “explanations” which involve different 
coordination mechanisms, agents’ behaviours and believes, etc. 
• Spin-off and imitation: new firms within a cluster are often started by former 
employees of pre-existing firms or originated by local people imitating successful 
entrepreneurs (through a sort of “contagion” process). Both phenomena are 
proportional to the incumbent mass; however, while the spin-off story alone will 
generate an exponential “explosive” development (if not balanced by some 
counteracting force or controlled by a variable “birth” rate), the imitation story – in 
a population of a given size – will generate an S-shaped development process since 
the imitation process is proportional to the product of the number of potential 
entrepreneurs and of actual ones (Anton and Yao, 1995; Klepper and Sleeper, 2002; 
Dahl, Pedersen and Dalum, 2003). 
• Signalling (a): in an uncertain environment, with strong information asymmetries 
between insiders and outsiders, the number of firms (belonging to the same 
industry) already located in the cluster signals the profitability of the location (due 
to the quality of the workforce, the availability of intermediate inputs, the general 
“business climate”) to potential entrants (Pascall and McCall, 1980). This 
informational forward spillover mechanism works even in absence of agglomeration 
economies and may generate “informational cascades” (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer 
and Welch, 1992; Hirshleifer, 1993), “herd behaviour” (Banjeree, 1992) and, with 
strong relocation costs”, lock-in phenomena. An interesting point is made by Choi 
(1997) who shows that the presence of informational externalities and spillovers 
may also work backward, i.e. the herd behaviour of subsequent entrants influences 
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the initial location decision, so that a bias against new locations can be created by 
the “fear of being stranded” (Choi, 1997, p. 408)2. 
• Signalling (b): by choosing to locate into a well established (i.e. larger) cluster, a 
firm signals its quality to potential customers by showing its ability to survive to 
harm’s length competition in the inputs (i.e. skilled labour, venture capital/bank 
funding, land, etc.) and in the output (especially if sold to other local firms as 
intermediate input) markets. This point is highlighted by Vettas (1999) who shows 
that – in an Hotelling-type model with both vertical and horizontal product 
differentiation – spatial agglomeration may be used as a high-quality signal by firms 
acting in an incomplete information environment. Thus choosing an established 
cluster is a quality signalling and reputation building strategy which, with imperfect 
ex-ante information on its own ability and risk prone entrepreneurs, may even 
generate excessive clustering3. Once the cluster becomes sufficiently large4, the fear 
of excessive competition reduce the entry rate thus stabilising the size of the cluster 
(Nocke, 2003).  
• Information diffusion5: information (news or rumours) about a new profitable 
location for a given type of firm may be diffused in a given population of potential 
entrants and entrepreneurs through an epidemic model (Grilliches, 1957; Bass, 
1969). If one assumes that information diffuses through contacts, and that these 
contacts are random, then at any moment of time the rate of diffusion of an 
innovation is proportional to both the fraction of actual users and the fraction of 
potential users. Alternative interpretations assume that, at any moment in time, there 
is perfect information on the existence and nature of the new cluster. However each 
potential entrepreneur/existing firm, before deciding whether or not to locate (or re-
                                                 
2 A similar behaviour, but in the context of complete information, has been studied by Farrel and Saloner 
(1985 and 1987) under the name of “penguin effect” from the behaviour of a flock of penguins gathered 
“on the edges of ice floes, each trying to jostle the other in first, because although all are hungry for fish, 
each fears there may be a predator lurking nearby” (Farrel and Saloner, 1987, p. 14). 
 
3 A similar result, applied to the clustering of scientist on a minority of “hot topics”, is obtained by Rocco 
(2003). 
 
4 The toughness of price competition is positively related to the size of the cluster, hence in larger markets 
opportunities are greater (more consumers, more suppliers) but price-cost margins are narrower. More 
talented (i.e. efficient) entrepreneurs benefit relatively more from larger markets (Nocke, 2003, p. 4). 
 
5 All the original references quoted in this explanation deal with technological diffusion. The 
interpretation within the location analysis framework has been proposed in Maggioni (2002). 
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locate), must compare the benefits and the costs of location. In “rank effects” 
models (David, 1969; Ireland and Stoneman 1986) it is assumed that the 
heterogeneity of potential entrants causes different returns from entry and, 
indirectly, different dates of location. In the “stock effects” models (Reinganum 
1981; Quirmbach 1986) the benefits from location depend on the existence of 
agglomeration economies and diseconomies. In the “order effects” (Ireland and 
Stoneman, 1985) models it is argued that location benefits to a firm depends on its 
position on the order of entry (on the basis of a “first come, better served” criterion). 
• Anchor tenant: originally conceived in the real estate economics literature, this 
label has been imported in the high-tech clusters literature by Feldman (2002) and 
refers to the fact that the existence of a large established industrial firm creates 
externalities that “contribute to benefits of agglomeration” (Feldman, 2002, p. 14). 
Thus the number of new start-up firms (and their internal growth) is therefore 
positively related to the number of anchor tenants in the cluster (due to knowledge 
spillovers, specialised inputs procurements and user innovation networks). This 
process is empirically confirmed and theoretically modelled by Rauch (1993) with 
specific reference to “artificial” clusters where developers play an active role in 
building the membership of an industrial park through a carefully designed strategy 
of discriminatory land pricing6. The location of large firms (either spontaneous or 
sponsored) may therefore act as catalyst of the clustering process in the early stages 
of an industry, when uncertainty is strong and no obvious location has still emerged.  
• Leader–suppliers relationship: Thoroughly described in the Italian literature on 
industrial districts (Belussi, 1988; Garofoli, 1991; Bramanti and Maggioni, 1997; 
Paniccia, 1998), this explanation focuses on the composite (both synergetic and 
competitive) relationship existing between a small number of large leading and 
innovative firms – acting as organizers and coordinators of the activity of the whole 
districts – and a large number of imitative small firms (often craftsmen) which act 
mainly, but not exclusively, as sub-contractors. The relationship between the 
development of these two populations of firms within the same industrial district is 
an example of complex co-evolution in which pecuniary externalities and 
                                                 
6 This strategy is based on the subsidisation of early (or “seed”) tenant (usually nationally prominent 
firms) while “later tenants are paying for the privilege of benefiting from economies of agglomeration as 
firms accumulate in the park, allowing the developers to recoup the cost they incurred in subsidising early 
tenants” (Rauch, 1993, p. 858). 
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competitive dynamics play different roles at different times (Folloni and Maggioni, 
1994). Suppliers like to be in a district with a sufficient number of leaders because 
of the higher price they can get for their product and because of the “insurance” they 
derive from the plurality of buyers but they suffer to be in a district with many 
leaders because they fear their competition on inputs (land, labour, credit). Leaders 
like to be in a district with a sufficient number of supplier because of the lower price 
they can pay for their intermediate inputs but they suffer to be in a district with too 
many sub-contractors because of the limited knowledge spillovers and the reduction 
in the appropriability of their innovation. 
• Institutional processes and social legitimacy: originally conceived in the 
organisational ecology literature (Carrol, 1988; Hannan and Freeman, 1989, Staber, 
1997) this explanation refers to the fact that density affects founding rates of 
“organisational population” (for our purposes a given type of firm) through 
institutional processes. “when numbers are small, those who attempt to create a 
form must fight for legitimacy. (…) Once a sufficient number of instance of the 
form exist, the need for justification (and thus the cost of organizing) declines. Other 
things being equal, legitimation of a form increases the founding rate of population 
using the form. If legitimacy increases with the prevalence of the form in the 
society, then legitimation processes produce positive density dependence in 
founding rates” Hannan and Freeman (1988, p. 21). If knowledge is assumed to be 
local, then the natural consequence of such a process is spatial clustering. The same 
process does not produce an unbound growth because is counterbalanced by 
competition: “the main source of negative density dependence is competition within 
and between populations. The more abundant are competitors, the smaller the 
potential gains from founding an organization at a given level of demand for product 
and services” (ibidem). 
• Agglomeration economies and diseconomies: originally conceived by Marshall 
(1920) and later rediscovered – firstly by the regional and urban economics 
literature (Isard, 1956; Henderson 1977) and secondly within the “new economic 
geography framework by Krugman (1991) – this explanation highlights that each 
new entrant increases the locational benefits to incumbents (because of the existence 
of labour market pool, intermediate inputs pool, technological externalities and 
knowledge spillovers) only up to a point, then it decreases them when competition 
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and congestion prevail. Both locational costs and gross benefits are non monotonic 
functions of the local industrial mass7. As far as costs are concerned, they are U-
shaped due to the classical combination of a decreasing average fixed cost schedule 
and an increasing variable fixed cost schedule; as far as gross benefits are concerned 
they have an inverted U shape due to the interaction of agglomeration economies 
and congestion phenomena over a limited amount of land and infrastructures8. Net 
locational benefits are described therefore by an inverted U-shape function of the 
number of located firms which is often quoted as the indirect microeconomic 
foundation of an S-shaped development path of the cluster.Locational benefits and 
costs and the development of an industrial clusterç 
Firms decide to settle in a cluster on the basis of the expected profitability of being 
located there. This profitability depends on net locational benefits - obtained as the 
difference between gross locational benefits and costs - which, in turn, are based on 
both observable and unobservable elements.  
For simplicity it can be assumed that, in an uncertain world - with limited information 
regarding local costs and revenues available to the outsiders - profitability expectations 
for any particular location will be based solely on the number of firms already located 
there (the number of previous locations being the only observable variable).  
Let us assume, as in Arthur (1988 and 1990), that locational gross benefits B fq for firm f 
locating in cluster q are composed of geographical and agglomeration benefits9 and let 
us model them as in Maggioni (2002). 
                                                 
7 Similar arguments support the existence of a unique optimal dimension of the city (Henderson, 1077; 
Richardson 1978). 
 
8 Even if no physical border exist to the expansion of the cluster one must take into account the existence 
of organizational “minimum efficient scale”. 
 
9 For analytical convenience I split locational benefits in two classes: geographical and agglomeration 
benefits. The first class refers to those components which are unaffected by the number of incumbents; 
while the second refers to those components which depend on the number of incumbents. By adopting 
this formulation, however, I do not intend to state that agglomeration benefits refer only to spillovers of 
scientific and technological knowledge and know-how. On the contrary I am convinced that relevant 
agglomeration benefits derive also from external economies of scale in the use of local resources. The 
same variable (i.e. labour productivity) has a fixed geographical component, which depends on the quality 
of local workers, and a variable agglomerative component which depends on the number of firms already 
located in the cluster. 
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Geographical benefits G fq  depend on the intrinsic features of the site (such as the 
quality of local factors of production: capital kq  and labour lq ; the efficiency of the 
local network of specialised suppliers and business service firms sq ; and the quality of 
urban and industrial infrastructures uq ). Agglomeration benefits ( )A nfq q  are a concave 
non monotonic function of the number of incumbents (i.e. firms already established in 
cluster q) nq . Thus: 
( )B G k l s u A nfq fq q q q q fq q= +, , , ( )               (1) 
The assumption of concavity and non monotonicity in Aq implies that, as the number of 
firms located in cluster q increases, gross benefits firstly increase because of 
agglomeration economies (due to productive specialisation; scientific, technical and 
commercial spillovers; reduction in both transport and transaction costs, increases in the 
quality of the local pool of skilled labour force and in the efficiency of the local credit 
market); then decrease when congestion more than compensates for agglomeration 
economies. 
Locational costs c fq , symmetrically, include two components: geographical costs g fq  
(reflecting the cost structure of the cluster in terms of locally prevailing wage wq  and 
interest rate rq ; average price of business services dq ; and level of land rent and 
taxation tq ), and agglomeration costs aq , which are assumed to be a convex non 
monotonic function of the number of regional incumbents nq . 
( )c g w r d t a nfq fq q q q q fq q= +, , , ( )               (2) 
The assumption of convexity and non monotonicity in aq  implies that, as the number of 
firms in cluster q increases, locational costs initially decrease until some “optimal” 
number of users for a given set of urban, industrial and environmental infrastructures 
and resources is reached. Then they increase due to the competition, between a larger 
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number of firms, for a limited pool of local inputs (i.e. capital, labour, business services, 
land and public infrastructures) which raises their prices10. 
Net locational benefits can now be calculated as the difference between equations (1) 
and (2). 
( ) ( )N B c H w r d t k l s u h nfq fq fq fq q q q q q q q q fq q= − = + , , , , , , ,         (3a) 
Assuming that the geographical benefits and costs do not change overtime, if we focus 
the analysis of the location process on the dynamics of the interactions between the 
level of available locational benefits, what becomes relevant for describing firms’ 
location decisions is just the net benefit function N fq in the incumbents’ space. I can 
therefore summarise the geographic components H fq with a parameter αq , which 
vertically shifts the locational net benefits function, and write the following expression: 
( )N B c h nfq fq fq q fq q= − = + α             (3b) 
It easy to see that the locational net benefits function (3b) is always concave, since 
N fq is equal to the difference between a concave function ( )B nfq q  and a convex one 
( )c nfq q . In other words, each marginal firm, which enters the cluster, increases the 
average profitability of locating in the cluster only up to a threshold. After that point, 
any new entrant lowers the average net benefits available to each resident firm and new 
entrant11. 
This formulation recalls some general results, obtained in the industrial location and 
urban/regional economics literature (Weber, 1929; Isard, 1956; Richardson, 1978; 
Papageorgiou, 1979; Tauchen and Witte, 1983; Miyao and Kanemoto, 1987), which 
                                                 
10 An alternative explanation for the convexity of the locational costs function for firm f runs as follows: 
the locational costs function is composed by a “fixed” and a “variable” component. The fixed part of the 
costs (geographic costs) decreases as the number of entrants increase; while the variable part increases 
(because of competition) as the number of entrants increase. The combination of these two effects 
produce an U-shaped (convex) cost curve as the interaction between fixed and variable costs of 
production in standard microeconomics textbooks. A symmetric reasoning may also explain the inverted 
U-shaped benefits function. This interpretation is surely more realistic than the one used in the paper, 
however it is not as theoretically efficient as the other one since both components become dependent on 
the number of incumbents. 
 
11 However, as it is made graphically evident in figure 1, because of the inverse U shape of the marginal 
benefits function, there is a range, within the number of incumbents, where marginal net benefits are 
already decreasing, but still higher than average ones, and average net benefits are still increasing. 
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show the existence of an optimal dimension of a given spatial agglomeration of firms 
and/or households because of the concavity of the various benefits functions.  
With the help of figure 1 (which shows both marginal and average locational costs and 
locational benefits schedules), I want firstly to highlight the existence of several 
“optimal” sizes12 of the region, and secondly to show how Kq  is endogenously 
determined by the structure of locational benefits and costs functions. 
Let us consider the costs and benefits derived from entering a region; for the sake of 
simplicity let firms outside the region experience zero locational benefits13 and assume 
that geographical benefits are set to zero. Firms are assumed, for the moment, to be 
locationally identical (i.e. the agglomeration economies and diseconomies, locational 
benefits and costs are the same for every firm). Therefore I can study the behaviour of a 
representative firm f and analyse its average net benefits function14.  
 
                                                 
12 Throughout the paper the “industrial size” or “economic mass” of a region is approximated by the 
number of located firms. This index can easily be substituted by a more realistic proxy of firms' 
dimension (such as employment or sales). However the number of firms has an obvious advantage in its 
simplicity and is the best indicator when the inter-firms relationships at study (i.e. knowledge spillovers) 
are independent of firm’s size. 
 
13 However, this assumption can easily be relaxed by assigning the locational benefits of the cluster a 
value equal to the difference between the locational benefits available outside and inside the cluster. 
 
14 By considering average functions I indirectly assume that some market mechanisms is at work in the 
cluster and makes both benefits and costs equal for each incumbent.  
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Figure 1 
Agglomeration costs and benefits for incumbents and critical sizes of a cluster 
 
Number of incumbents
Agglomeration 
benefits  
and costs  Average net benefits 
Average costs  
Marginal net benefits  
Marginal costs 
Average gross benefits
Marginal gross benefits 
A  O  C X K B  B'
 
 
A is the minimal sustainable dimension of the cluster (i.e. where agglomeration net 
benefits start to be positive and, consequently,
( )dn t
dt
q > 0 ). Prior to A no firm will 
spontaneously enter the region (because agglomeration benefits are negative). A can be 
called the “critical mass” of the region. A can be reached only by a group of co-
ordinated firms entering together, or by direct intervention of a public authority aimed at 
subsidising entries until n(t) = A. 
B is the dimension where average agglomeration costs are minimum. B’ is the cluster 
dimension which maximises gross average agglomeration benefits. B and B’ underline 
the importance of analysing both costs and benefits of location to avoid harmful 
misrepresentation of the economic reality, as in some early contributions of location 
theory15. Obviously, it could also be the case that B’ < B. 
C gives the maximum per firm net benefits (i.e. average net benefits). Up to C every 
new entrant increases (by its very entry) the average benefits of all incumbents; after C 
the average benefits decrease. C is therefore the optimal size of cluster for incumbent 
firms; however, it is neither the social efficient outcome (given that marginal benefits 
are still greater than marginal costs) nor the maximum possible dimension (average 
benefits are still positive). At C, several firms outside the region might still want to 
                                                 
15 Here the reference is to the debate betweenthe “least cost” and the “demand side” approaches. 
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enter, while firms already in the region would like to deter further entries. Here there is 
a contrast between incumbents, outsiders and public authorities, each of them with a 
different view of what is the optimal outcome. 
X is the economically efficient (i.e. social optimum) dimension. At X marginal costs 
equal marginal benefits, therefore the total benefits (number of firms times per capita 
benefits) are maximised. However, as the average benefits at X are still positive, some 
outsiders would still like to enter. Such entries would reduce the total amount of 
benefits available to incumbents. 
K is the maximum dimension of the region (in terms of economic mass) since 
B cfq fq= . From K onwards no more net entry is deserved because, after this point, 
average benefits are negative and therefore there are no incentives to enter. However, 
new entries are still possible but these would be at the expense of some incumbents who 
would be driven out of the cluster16. 
 
4. The “life cycle” of clusters: an ecological model  
The simplest growth model for an industrial cluster q - which stresses the relevance of 
firms spatial interactions - can be expressed in the following format: “the rate of growth 
of the industrial mass equals the product of the individual firm’s contribution17 to the 
regional population’s growth and the number of firms already in the cluster” (Maggioni, 
1993, 1999).  
If only positive feedbacks mechanism (such as spin-off, agglomeration economies and 
knowledge spillovers) are taken into account (and these are assumed to be constant), 
then each individual firm’s contribution to the level of average locational benefits and, 
consequently, to the growth of cluster q, would be equal to a constant rq . In this case 
cluster industrial growth would follow an “explosive” exponential path18, formally: 
                                                 
16 After K new entries thus support a turnover process without causing relevant changes to the 
equilibrium level. 
 
17 In terms of changes in the average locational net benefits, due to the interaction of agglomeration 
economies and diseconomies. 
 
18 The higher the cluster’s growth rate (rq), the faster the growth process. 
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)(tnrn
dt
dn
qqq
q  == &               (4a) 
Equation (4a) can also be solved for n tq ( ) as function of the exogenous initial industrial 
mass of the cluster nq ( )0 : 
n t e nq
r t
q
q( ) ( )=    0               (4b) 
On the other hand, if negative feedbacks (such as congestion and competition effects, or 
epidemic dynamics) are included, then some modifications to this simple model are 
required to allow for some “density dependent” factors to progressively depress the 
level of locational benefits and to slow down the process of industrial growth of the 
cluster. A simple dynamic model, which takes into account these features is the logistic 
equation19, which can be written as (5a) 
( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −==
q
q
qq
q
K
tn
tnrn
dt
dn
1&              (5a) 
where rq  is the incipient (or maximum) rate of increase and ( )K n tq t q= →∞lim , is called 
the cluster “equilibrium” level20.  
Integrating equation (5a) and solving it for n tq ( ) as function of the exogenous initial 
industrial mass of the cluster nq ( )0 one obtains (5b): 
( ) ( )( )( )n t
K n e
K n eq
q q
r t
q q
r t
q
q
= + −
0
0 1
 
               (5b) 
Plotting ( )n tq against time yields an S-shaped curve due to the counteracting roles 
played by rq  and Kq .  
 
                                                 
19 The logistic equation - firstly developed by Verhulst (1845) and Pearl and Reed (1920) for 
demographic studies, then adopted by the ecological literature since Lotka (1925) - “is the simplest model 
containing negative density dependence interaction. Further, it is the first two terms in a power series 
expansion of a more general growth model where the growth is a function of the actual size of the 
population” (Dendrinos and Mullally, 1985, p. 38). 
 
20 Or, in the original ecological jargon, the carrying capacity, defined as: “a measure of the amount of 
renewable resources in the environment in units of the number of organisms these resources can support” 
(Roughgarden, 1979, p. 305). 
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Figure 2 
The development of an industrial cluster (in isolation) 
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Source: Maggioni (2002a) 
 
When the cluster is small (i.e. ( )n tq  is close to zero) the term in brackets in equation 
(5a) is close to one (hence the logistic equation approximately describes an exponential 
growth path); but as ( )n tq  approaches Kq , the term in brackets tends to zero, driving 
the growth rate to zero and terminating the entry process.  
Both Kq  and rq  play a major role in shaping a logistic growth path: the greater is rq  the 
steeper is the S shaped curve, the larger Kq  the higher the ceiling level of the function 
(and the equilibrium size of the cluster). 
rq  is the cluster’s incipient (or intrinsic) growth rate. In the ecological literature it is 
calculated as the difference between the birth and mortality rates of a population. This 
observation can be translated into the economic framework when net entry (and 
consequently the intrinsic rate of industrial growth of a cluster) is calculated as the 
difference between total entries (or start-ups) and exits (or bankruptcies) in the period 
considered. The same value of rq  can therefore correspond to two very different 
situations: a steady growing cluster where few new firms enter and no one exits, and a 
perturbed cluster where a high “birth” rate is almost compensated for by a high “death” 
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rate. Hence rq  is a composite index that describes the cluster growth “potential” and the 
probability that firms, once entered, survive in the cluster. 
Kq  defines the regional industrial carrying capacity: the maximum number of profitable 
firms the cluster can sustain in isolation (i.e. when inter-regional interaction are not 
considered). Kq  will depend upon: 
i) the finite quantity of geographical benefits (which is related to the limited 
availability of local “resources” such as: labour, capital, land, intermediate inputs 
and infrastructures); 
ii) the decreasing part of the agglomeration benefits function (which depends on the 
strategic interactions between firms: competition, congestion and lobbying of 
incumbents).  
Kq  is therefore determined by the relationship between the amount of resources (inputs) 
available in the cluster and the (technical and organizational) efficiency of incumbents 
in the use of these resources. Therefore in the long run Kq  may change as result of the 
inflow of additional skilled workers, the provision of new advanced public 
infrastructure, the diffusion of (technical, organisational, etc.) innovations.  
For a given cluster q and a given population of Mq outsider firms
21, therefore, I assume 
that there is an equilibrium level K Mq q≤  acting as an upper limit to the cluster’s 
growth. In each period t, the number of entries therefore depends both on the actual 
number of potential entrants ( )K n tq q−  (i.e. the number of outsider firms which can 
enter the cluster in time t and still make profits) and on the number of firms already 
located there ( )n tq . Kq  and ( )n tq  in fact determine the level of average locational net 
benefits available to incumbent firms in each period of time. 
In this first formulation, the number of located firms directly generates (through 
agglomeration dynamics) the level of locational benefits; since the entry rate is assumed 
to be proportional to the level of locational benefits, it also indirectly determines the 
location of new firms into the cluster.  
                                                 
21 Composed of two main categories: firms already established outside the cluster and potential 
entrepreneurs inside the cluster looking for the right moment to start their own business. 
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Such a formulation of the location process is very simple but can be used to empirically 
estimate key parameters of the location path of different clusters22. These estimated 
parameter could also be used as dependent variables in cross-section analyses in order 
to assess the influence of different factors on the level of the intrinsic growth rate of a 
cluster or on its maximum dimension. 
One can plot the original formulation of expression (5a), i.e. a quadratic relation 
between firms formation (or entry) and the stock of firms already located (operating) in 
the cluster, as in figure 3: 
 
Figure 3 
The development of an industrial cluster (stock-flows relation). 
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Source: adapted from Maggioni, 2002b 
 
Figure 3 has the advantages of showing two crucial dimension of an industrial cluster: 
A, the critical mass, i.e. the minimum dimension for a self-sustaining cluster and K, the 
carrying capacity ( Kq ), i.e. the maximum number of profitable firms the cluster can 
sustain in isolation due to the limited availability of local “resources” such as: labour, 
capital, land, and infrastructures and to the existence of strategic interactions 
(competition, congestion and lobbying of incumbents) between firms already located in 
the cluster. 
                                                 
22 Where the difference may refers to different industries in the same geographical site, or to different 
geographical sites in the same industry.  
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Here the individual firm’s contribution to the cluster’ growth (and the cluster growth 
rate) is highest at the beginning of the development process and decreases as a linear 
function of the cluster’s population size: 
( )tn
K
r
r
n
n
q
q
q
q
q
q −=&                 (6) 
An alternative formulation of the relationship existing between firms’ entry and firms’ 
existing stock within an industrial cluster use a cubic version of the original logistic 
function as follows: 
⎟⎟⎠
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Expression (7) differs from expression (4a), because the individual firm’s contribution 
to the cluster’s growth (and the cluster growth rate) is a quadratic function of the cluster 
population size: 
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Such a formulation – where the growth rate of the cluster is limited both at the 
beginning (birth phase) and at the end (maturity) of the development path of the cluster 
– is useful to describe the development path of a cluster based on a new innovative 
technology, as will be shown in section 4. 
While the time pattern of development is very similar to the situation depicted in figure 
1, the relationship between the cluster’s growth and the current dimension of the cluster 
is different and displays an initial convexity in the generally concave curve (as 
represented in figure 4). 
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Figure 4 
The development of an innovative industrial cluster (stock-flows relation). 
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However both formulations can be criticised on a number of grounds. The main 
drawback refers to the “isolation hypothesis” which assumes that firms’ location 
decisions are modelled as a dichotomous choice (there is only one possible site for 
location and the choice variable is just the timing of the entry) and no external factor 
influences the cluster’s development.  
Previous works by the author (Maggioni, 1993, 2000, 2002a, 2004b) extend this simple 
logistic equation to a system of differential equations in order to take into account a 
series of different inter-industry and inter-cluster bilateral interactions23. In this paper I 
will focus the attention on the interactions arising between an already developed cluster 
and a newly emerging one based on the rise of a new technology. 
 
5. The interactions between established and emerging clusters 
5.1.  Technology and the life cycle of clusters 
Let’s assume as in section 2 that the development of an established cluster in isolation 
(cluster i) is described by equation (5a). Cluster i is specialised in the production of a 
well known product and uses an established technology. Now – following Brezis and 
                                                 
23 Such as competition, mutualism, commensalism, amensalism, predation. 
 20
Krugman (1997), with some crucial changes – let’s assume that, after a certain time, τ, a 
new technology is introduced. The new technology may represent a new way to produce 
the same product (process innovation) or a new kind of the same product (product 
innovation). The critical hypotheses on the relationships between the two technologies 
are the following:  
H.1. each technology follows a learning curve so that productivity is an increasing 
function of the cumulative experience within the cluster; 
H.2. “past” experience is irrelevant (i.e. cumulative output produced by using the old 
technology has no effect on the new technology’s learning curve); 
H.3. the new technology is potentially superior (i.e. for a given amount of cumulative 
output the new technology is more productive or, in other words, learning 
effects are greater for the new technology); 
H.4. despite this potential advantage the new technology is initially inferior to the old, 
given that no cumulative output exists for the new technology in any cluster; 
H.5. while initially inferior to the old technology, the new technology is good enough 
that in a newly established cluster (of smaller size, thus with lower degree of 
competition and congestion) it allows higher locational benefits. 
Firms choose which cluster to enter on the basis of the locational benefits available. The 
shape of locational benefits functions (and, consequently, the shape of the cluster’s 
growth function) is crucially dependent on the technology used in the cluster. The 
growth of the established cluster is described by equation (5a): a “classical” logistic 
function (with an initially large, but linearly decreasing with the cluster’s size, growth 
rate). The growth of the new cluster is described by equation (7), a “cubic” logistic 
function (with an “inverted U” growth rate, i.e. low for both very small and very large 
sizes of the cluster). 
Firms can relocate from one cluster to another one and, by relocating, they absorb the 
“industrial atmosphere” (technological and knowledge spillovers, etc.) connected with 
the technology used locally. In particular, when firms relocate from the “old” cluster to 
the “new” one, they are able to exploit the knowledge spillovers, to poach already 
trained workers and thus they become able to use the new technology. 
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The results obtained by Brezis and Krugman may be replicated in this adapted 
framework and are rather sharp: “When the new technology becomes available, firms in 
the established center (cluster) do not adopt it, because given their experience they 
remain more productive with the old technology. A new smaller center (cluster) comes 
into being, however, because the new technology is good enough to compete with the 
old (in a newly established cluster). (…A)s the new technology matures through 
learning, both the new technology and the new city-region (cluster) that is based upon 
it, take over from the established region (cluster)” (Brezis and Krugman, 1987, p. 
380)24.  
The story is based on the assumption that the key external economies that support the 
development of the cluster are learning effects associated with the geographical 
concentration of an industry in a cluster. As long as the technology undergoes “normal 
progress” (i.e. follows a technological trajectory) the interchange of knowledge within 
the established cluster will tend to preserve its leadership. When new technologies 
arrive that are discontinuous with those that came before (i.e. change the technological 
paradigm) existing industry concentration may be of little value and the result then is 
that new technologies tend to be exploited in new clusters that do not suffer the 
diseconomies associated with an established cluster. 
The relation between the introduction of a technological innovation and the emergence 
of a new cluster is crucially dependent on H.3, i.e. on the fact that learning economies 
are greater for the new technology, and may be easily seen, in a two-periods framework, 
                                                 
24 A somehow similar problem, but modelled in a different way (with two different, and complementary, 
types of workers), is studied by David and Rosenbloom (1990) which show that “the growth of 
employment at a rival location poses a dire threat to the prospects for continued growth (of the cluster) 
and may even replace growth with contraction” (David and Rosenbloom, 1990, p. 357). The results 
obtained by these authors are more complex than Krugman and Brezis’s ones. In particular David and 
Rosenbloom cannot model explicitly a case in which “two urban places were competing with each other 
for the same mobile work force. (In such a case), the contraction of the labour force at one locale would 
imply its further expansion at the other center. (…) It may be seen that the transfer of workers between 
the two cities will have two contradictory effects (…). On the one hand the expansion of the growing 
city’s labour force increases the size of the labour market externality at that location, on the other hand , 
the transfer of workers reduces the capital-labour ratio – and hence wages – in the growing city, while 
raising the capital-labour ratio in the other city. As a result, the effect of labour force growth at a rival 
location are no longer unambiguous” (ibid. p. 366-367). 
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in figure 5, where the sizes of the clusters are measured along the same horizontal axes 
so that always Nnn ji =+ 25. 
In the first period (denoted by’) cluster i, thanks to the established technology and the 
cumulated output is experiencing a larger carrying capacity, Ki, while cluster j, which is 
based on an innovative technology (and a new product with an initially smaller market), 
is characterised by a smaller one, Kj. Given that firms choose in which cluster to locate 
on the basis of the level of locational benefits, the only stable equilibrium in the first 
period is E’ where ji BB '' =  and ji nn '' >>  given that: 
• for 'Eni > , ij BB > , therefore firms will leave cluster i for cluster j, reducing in ; 
• for 'Eni < , ij BB < , thus firms will leave cluster j for cluster i , increasing in . 
• In the second period (denoted by ”) both functions of locational benefits have 
shifted up because of the learning economies. However, given the diminishing 
returns to experience and the carachteristics of the new technology, function Bj rise 
more than Bi (Kj increase more than Ki). Therefore the new equilibriom becomes E” 
where ji BB "" =  and ij nn "" >>   
                                                 
25 The inequality part of the expression ensure the existence of a non trivial (i.e. when each cluster 
reaches its own K) interaction between the two clusters. 
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Figure 5 
Learning effects and clusters’ leapfrogging 
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The above results are based on a comparative static framework, where only the 
relationship between the size of the cluster and the level of locational benefits is 
explicitely modelled. The following section is devoted to model a similar story within a 
dynamic framework embedded in the original ecological framework developed in 
section 2. 
5.2.  An ecological modelling of clusters’ technological life cycle  
Let’s start by recalling that the development process of the established cluster in 
isolation is described by an equation similar to (5a): 
⎟⎟⎠
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Let’s also assume that, after a certain time26 from the birth of cluster i, an improved new 
technology is discovered. From section 4.1. it is already known that the technology will 
not be adopted by cluster i, due to the cumulated experience in the old technology 
which grant it a higher productivity, so another cluster based on the new technology 
                                                 
26 With τ being the time lag between the birth of cluster i and of cluster j. 
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(let’ call it cluster j) is founded on a previously “deserted” space (where there is no 
experience of any technology). 
Because of the superior performances of the new technology, for a given level of 
cumulated output, and the larger learning economies, the new cluster will attract a share 
λ of the firms located in cluster i. Therefore cluster i will experience an outflow of firms 
as described by equation (10) and depicted in figure 6: 
iii nmO  λ== &             (10a) 
Graphically the outflow can be represented in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 
The outflows from an established industrial cluster (constant out-take) 
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However it seems reasonable to suppose that the outflow from cluster i (i.e. the share of 
its firms’ stock) will be also proportional to the industrial mass of cluster j. Equation 4a 
can be modified to take into account this remark by substituting 
i
ji
n
nnλ=Λ to the 
original value of the slope of the outflow function (λ), thus modelling im& as a function 
of the product of the industrial masses of the two clusters27. Formally 
                                                 
27 Which is the usual way to model the interaction between two populations in the population ecology 
literature from Lotka (1925), to Maynard Smith (1974), to Roughgarden (1979). For an application to 
industrial and regional economics see Dendrinos and Mullaly (1985), Nijkamp and Reggiani (1992). For 
an explicit application to industrial clusters see Maggioni (2002a). 
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The growth of cluster j, because of the use of the innovative technology, will follow a 
cubic logistic function as described in equation (11): 
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Therefore the slope of iO  will grow overtime, being dependent on the (square root of 
the) product of the industrial mass of cluster i and cluster j, starting from zero and 
growing until both clusters reach their ceiling level28. 
 
Figure 7 
The outflows from an established industrial cluster (variable out-take) 
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The net growth of cluster i will depend on the difference between iG  and iO  or more 
formally: 
i
i
i
iiiiii nK
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28 While the functional form adopted in the simulations is non linear, the qualitative results (i.e. the 
number and stability of equilibria) can be graphically expressed with a linear approximation without loss 
of generality. 
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The value of such an expression cannot be analytically calculated but it is possible to 
study the characteristics of the results through the following diagrams in a sort of 
comparative static analysis and then run a series of simulations. 
Graphically the solution of equation 6 can be described by overlapping figures 3 and 6 
as in figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 
The growth and depletion of an industrial cluster (3 equilibria) 
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At each moment of time the dynamics of the cluster will be determined by the relative 
position of iG  and iO . Every time iG  > iO , in  will increase, every time iO  > iG , in  
will decrease. in&  will be equal to zero, thus in  will be constant over time only at the 
intercept with the horizontal axis and when iG  = iO . In general, according to the size of 
cluster i, three different dynamics may emerge. 
1) If '0 nni <≤ , the cluster will unravel until it disappears; 
2) if ''' nnn i <≤ , the cluster will grow and reach size n” (with n” < K); 
3) if inn ≤'' , the cluster will decrease until size n’’ is reached. 
0 and n” are stable equilibria, while n’ is an unstable one. 
When iO  grows, two alternative situations may emerge as depicted in figure 9 
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Figure 9 
The growth and depletion of an industrial cluster 
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When 'ii OO = , the equation will display two equilibria (a stable one and a saddle 
point):  
1) If *0 nni <≤ , the cluster will unravel until it disappears; 
2) if inn >* , the cluster will decrease until size n* is reached. 
When 'ii OO > , the equation will display only one stable equilibrium (the origin).  
Thus the development path of cluster i, given the existence of cluster j, will depend on 
three parameters: 
1) jr : the intrinsic growth rate of cluster j; 
2) jK : the carrying capacity of cluster j; 
3) λ : the share of “migrant” firms in cluster i29; 
and on the time lag  existing between the start of cluster i, and the start of cluster j. 
A series of simulation show that: the lower the value of each of the three parameters 
(keeping constant the other two), and the longer the time lag, the more likely cluster i 
will “survive” the competition of cluster j; conversely the higher the value of each of the 
                                                 
29 Λi will take into account these three effects together, that’s why it is better to look singularly at ri, Ki 
and λiin order to disentangle each single effect.  
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three parameters (keeping constant the other two), and the shorter the time lag, the more 
likely cluster i will be “destroyed” by the existence of cluster j. 
 
6. Policy implications 
Local policy makers a/o private agents interested in the development of cluster i (as the 
“developers” in Henderson, 1977) have two different policy alternatives, which 
correspond to the above mentioned parameters r and K. 
By referring to equation (9) it is possible to distinguish between two main types of 
policy interventions alternatively aimed at: 
i) increasing the maximum rate of cluster’s growth (by increasing ir ),  
ii) raising the long run equilibrium size of the cluster (by increasing iK ).  
Let us now consider in details these two types of policy interventions. 
An r-type policy is designed to increase the positive externalities which are 
endogenously generated by the location of a new firm in the cluster. The intrinsic rate of 
growth, ir , expresses the largest possible “attraction and generation” power
30 of a given 
number of located firms and influences the growth rate of the cluster. An r-type policy 
explicitly supports the role played by agglomeration economies and knowledge 
spillovers in the development process of a cluster. The parameter ir  also expresses the 
difference between firms’ birth and mortality rates in the region ( )iiir δβ −= . An r-
type policy can therefore aim at increasing the birth rate, and/or at decreasing the firms’ 
“infant mortality” rate, within the region through appropriate interventions (such as 
innovation diffusion supporting policies, start-up incentives, provision of business 
planning services, diffusion of venture capital activities, etc.). An r-type policy is 
therefore a policy intervention to be used in order to foster the initial phase of 
development of a cluster in an initial “hostile” environment. It must be implemented 
when the targeted area is in the initial stages of development, either in a particular 
industry or more generally in any industry. 
                                                 
30 Which encompasses the entry of firms that were located outside the cluster and the “birth” of new firms 
inside the cluster. 
 29
A K-type policy is designed to increase the regional “carrying capacity” which is the 
region’s ability to sustain a given number of profitable “representative”31 firms. Since 
the carrying capacity is a function of the local endowment of resources (inputs and 
infrastructures) and of the average level of use of these resources made by resident 
firms, then any public policy aimed at increasing the quantity and/or quality of local 
inputs and infrastructures, and at raising the efficiency of local firms can be defined as a 
K-type policy. 
Although it may well be the case that between r-type, K-type policies there exist some 
sort of intrinsic incompatibility; any policy maker faces a more simple and obvious 
trade off between these two policies given by the limited budget he/she can use to foster 
the process of local industrial development. Budget constraint means therefore that the 
policy maker must use some ordering criterion to make the best choice. 
In general, it has been observed (Maggioni, 2002b) that the desirability of these 
different development policies is crucially dependent on the preferred target of the 
intervention, the chosen time framework for the implementation of the policy, the level 
of development of the targeted cluster and the state and variability of the relevant 
external macro-economic conditions. 
As far as the target of the policy is concerned, r-type policies are mainly addressed to 
firms, while K-type policies usually target the economic environment and the 
productive and urban infrastructures of the local economic system. According to this 
taxonomy r-type policies imply interventions such as start-up incentives, fiscal 
allowances, information diffusion programmes. The fostering of the local university and 
the strengthening of the regional network of transport and communication 
infrastructures can be defined as K-type policies. 
An alternative criterion, relates to the time horizon which is needed for the 
implementation of the economic policy interventions. Usually r-type policies generate 
results in the short run, while K-type policy needs a longer time period to be effective. 
On the other hand, while the first type merely influence the starting date and speed of 
development (without changing any structural conditions), K-type policies are the only 
                                                 
31 The concept of representative or average firms is used in this paper to take into account the fact that, in 
reality, firms differ in size and that the growth of an high-tech cluster may imply either the increase in the 
number of established firms (i.e. the entry of new firms in the region) or the growth in size of a number of 
located firms. For a formal framework which explicitly models in different ways the entry and the growth 
of firms, see Swann et al. (1998).  
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ones capable of moving the cluster size from a lower equilibrium level to an higher one, 
thus ensuring higher sustainable long-run growth. 
A third criterion refers to the stage of development of the targeted region. A r-type 
intervention is perfectly suited to be implemented in a “developing” region where the 
main problem is the establishment and early survival of the “seed” firms within the 
cluster. Finally a K-type intervention is designed to be implemented in an industrially 
developed area where competition on inputs and congestion of infrastructures are the 
main obstacles to the further development of the cluster. 
A final criterion is associated with the state and variability (i.e. depth and frequency of 
exogenous shocks) of the relevant32 external macro economic environment. According 
to macro-economic conditions the best development strategy may involve pure r-type, 
or pure K-type policies when the environment is stable; an intermediate policy when 
shocks are frequent and limited; and a mixed policy (i.e. a weighted combination of 
pure r-type and pure K-type) when shocks are deep but infrequent33. 
More specifically the different policy interventions have been compared on the basis of 
a twofold experiment: in the first part it has been assumed that each euro spent by the 
policy maker has a similar effect on the three different policies (in terms of overcoming 
the critical mass, increasing the intrinsic growth rate, raising the carrying capacity of the 
cluster); in the second part it has been assumed that it is comparatively easier to lower 
the general entry and relocation costs (r-type policy), than to overcome the structural 
constraints hindering the cluster’s growth (K-type policy). 
A series of simulations, whose results are described in the appendix, show that, r-type 
outperform (in terms of effectiveness) K-type policies when the only threat for the 
established cluster is the development of the new one34. This result is further reinforced 
if one considers that r-type are also more efficient than K-type policies. 
 
                                                 
32 For an open and internationally integrated region the relevant external environment may well be the 
world, for a closed and underdeveloped region the relevant environment is likely to be limited to the 
nation, for an intermediate type of region, the external macro-environment is a group of countries (i.e. 
Europe for a European country). 
 
33 For a detailed analysis of the relevance of the external macro-economic conditions, see Gambarotto-
Maggioni (1996). 
 
34 The effectiveness of the different policies has been tested against three different sensibility tests 
performed on rj, Kj, and λ. 
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7. Conclusion 
The spatial agglomeration of a number of innovative firms, which causes the genesis of 
a new high-tech cluster is such a complex and serendipitous phenomenon that no 
theoretical approach neither econometric estimation may pretend to fully explained it.  
This paper has followed a different strategy, by adopting the population ecology 
approach, and has focussed on the interactions existing between technological 
innovation and the life-cycle of clusters.  
Thus, in a sense, the paper confirmed the claim that industrial location patterns are 
created through “the process of growth rather than through a process of efficient 
allocation of plants across a static economic landscape” (Storper and Walker, 1989, p. 
70) and that “industries produce regions (clusters) and are capable of creating their own 
geography”. 
This paper points out the importance of “lateral thinking” in development planning: 
both scholars and policy makers should in fact always look carefully at the industrial 
and technological dynamics which may swiftly transform a “new” cluster into an “old” 
one and reverse the direction of the cumulative causation process thus transforming a 
successful developing cluster into a decaying one. 
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Appendix 
The simulations used in the paper has been conducted on the basis of the following 
benchmark case. 
100=iK , 120=jK , 1.0=ir , 2.0=jr , ( ) 10 =in , ( ) 10 =jn , 20=τ , 05.0=Λ , 
5
1=∆t 35. 
In order to perform the simulation it has been necessary to transform equation (12) into 
an equivalent difference equation version as follows 
i
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The first set of simulations have been conducted by performing sensibility tests on the 
following parameters ( τ,,, Λjj rK ) raising their value and keeping constant the value of 
the others until cluster i was driven to extinction. 
The policy experiment has been conducted in the following way. 
• It has been exogenously assumed that an r-type policy would double the intrinsic 
growth rate of cluster i ( 4.02 == iPi rr ); while a K-type policy would double the 
carrying capacity of cluster i ( 2002 == iPi KK )36 
• It has been chosen a value of the interaction coefficient ( 7.0=Λ ) which the first set 
of simulations have shown to produce the extinction of cluster i. 
100=iK , 120=jK , 1.0=ir , 2.0=jr , ( ) 10 =in , ( ) 10 =jn , 20=τ  
• Each type of policy has been performed on cluster i to check whether it was able to 
sustain the growth of cluster i even in presence of an “attractive” cluster i. 
                                                 
35 The simulation package (Stella Research 7.02) transforms the original differential equations of the 
theoretical model into difference equations. Therefore the choice of ∆t (the interval of time between 
calculations) is somehow crucial in order to avoid “weird” results (it must be remembered that a logistic 
equation in discrete time may even produce chaotic behaviours). It should also be noted that throughout 
the simulations “time” must be intended as “logical time” (i.e. runs) and not as “historic time”. 
 
36 Different experiments have been performed by attributing different values to different policy 
interventions. In particular, table 1 shows results also for an r-type policy which raises the intrinsic 
growth rate by one and a half. 
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• A sensibility tests has been performed on the following parameters ( Λ,, jj rK ) 
raising the value of each parameter and keeping constant the value of the others until 
cluster i was driven to extinction. The larger the value, the better the policy. 
 34
The following table shows the highest value of Λ,, jj rK , still compatible with the 
existence of cluster i and ni* (i.e. the largest possible size of cluster i in that given 
environment). 
 
 Sensibility on rj Sensibility on Kj Sensibility on Λ 
Policy 
interventions 
rj ni* Kj ni* Λ ni* 
2002 == iPi KK  0.35 130 208 67 0.10 93 
4.02 == iPi rr  1.50 39 331 35 0.14 44 
3.05.1 == iPi rr  0.39 52 224 35 0.11 39 
 35
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